3. Pass Defenses

CHANGES IN  DEFENSIVE  FOOTBALL

Thus far, this book has been a rather single-minded account with em­phasis on the offense, particularly the skills in throwing a forward pass. So, for a change, let's look at the other side of the picture and I will try to document my answer to the question the gentlemen of the press invariably ask a graybeard like myself during an interview, "What is the biggest change in professional football since you entered this ever-changing game?" Invariably I reply that the biggest change in football since 1949 has been the emphasis placed on defense.

There is a further, more important, reason for discussing defense before taking up pass patterns and the other aspects of the aerial attack. Since the pass defense has to be outwitted and outgunned, it is of primary im­portance to recognize the various defensive alignments (and know the thinking behind them) against which passes are to be thrown. You have to know what you're up against before you can go about beating it intelligently.

THE OLD 5-3 DEFENSE. The standard defense played in 1949 was a 5-3, man-to-man rampart, as shown in Diagram 4. As you might gather, the passing game was exploited to its utmost in making the 5-3 defense obsolete. The harassed defensive halfback had to cover the spread end, man to man, over an acre of field. The inside safety man had to cover the tight end, man to man, deep to his inside and outside. The other defensive halfback was forced to cover the flanker all over the field.

To further burden or weaken the defense, the linebacker to the spread-end side also had to cover the man in motion, the left halfback, on swing patterns. This was similar to Citation racing a plow horse—a physical mismatch. If the fullback swung, the middle linebacker was forced to cover him all over the field. In brief, the offensive team had a distinct advantage over the defense a decade or so ago.

At that time, the Los Angeles Rams under Clark Shaughnessy, father of the modern T formation, and Joe Stydahar were rewriting offensive records by striking through the air. With great receivers like Tom Fears, Elroy Hirsch, Glenn Davis, Verda Smith, Tom  Kalmanir, Dick Hoerner, and

Tank Younger, the opponents' pass defense was almost at the mercy of the Rams. From 1949 through 1951 these players set individual and team records that still stand.

This tremendous offensive surge rolled over teams by almost any score if the Rams chose to put forth the effort. But, as is usually the case, there is always one guy around who can lick you, and in this instance, the nemesis of the Rams was the Philadelphia Eagles, coached by the wily Greasy Neale.

THE 5-4 DEFENSE. Greasy is generally credited with devising the 5-4, man-to-man defense, as shown in Diagram 5. This defense and its strong personnel stopped the Rams and the long, ''cheap" touchdown cold.

Observe in Diagram 5 that the Eagles went from a three-deep, man-to­man defense to a four-deep coverage. By moving the spread-side linebacker, Wojie,  over the spread end,  the spread end could not get off the line sprinting, thus making Pat McHugh's job easier. McHugh and Frank Reagan could double the spread end; Wojie could move in and cover the left half on his swing routes.

This occurred only rarely because Wojie (or Alexander Wojciechowicz if you prefer the full treatment) did not have the speed to cover the left halfback. Armstrong and Craft covered the tight end and the flanker man to man. If the left halfback blocked on the play, Reagan was free to cover the deep middle, looking for anyone infiltrating that area. Ordinarily, Reagan took his key from the action of the left halfback and Wojie spent his time checking ends as they sprang from the line of scrimmage. Mean­while, Muha checked the tight end tough and always released him to the outside. Joe's rule was never to release an end inside for there was no middle linebacker to cover him on quick passes over the middle.

The odd defense, the five-man line, gave the best angle for the defensive ends to rush and contain the passer. The Eagles' duo of Jay McDowell and Johnny Green were tremendous pass-rushers. When they strapped their ears back and flew down the line after the passer, the job of the defensive halfbacks was immeasurably easier.

The defensive tackles, Vic Sears and Mike Jarmoluk, and the middle guard, Piggy Barnes (subsequently a TV actor), played one of two games. Barnes would tee off and go full blast over the center. When Piggy did this, the two tackles would play soft, or hit and hold, cover for Barnes, then pursue the ball.

The other game this trio played was just the opposite. Sears and Jarmoluk would pinch down the line as hard as they could. Barnes would hit the center, back off to cover for the tackles, and then pursue the ball carrier. They were perfect animals for this defense and were uncanny on their calls. Although relatively small, Sears was the smartest, and one of the best, defensive tackles of his time.

This Eagle defense raised havoc with the offensive minds of the National Football League until one September night in 1950 at Philadelphia's huge Municipal Stadium when coach Paul Brown and his Cleveland Browns shocked the football world and a crowd of 72,000 by defeating the Eagles, 35-10.   How did they do it?

1. Neale took victory for granted, belittling the perennial champions of the defunct All-American Conference and not even taking the trouble to scout them.
2. Neale also woefully underestimated Paul Brown as a coach and the Browns as a team.
3. There was the emergence of the sideline pass as a potent offensive factor.   With the Eagles unprepared for it, the sharp throw from quarter­ back Otto Graham to ends Dante Lavelli and Mac Speedie was a constant ground gainer and a debilitating threat.
4. The Browns used the Motley draw and the Motley trap.   When the Eagles put the rush on Graham, he outsmarted them with hand-offs to Marion Motley, the big fullback.
5. The   Browns   provided   good   pass   protection   for   Graham.   This sharpshooter was given the utmost in protection by his linemen, enabling him to pick out his targets with ease.
6. Coach Brown gave a pep talk.   He said simply,  "tonight you get your chance to play against the great Steve Van Buren."   Ironically, the Browns didn't.   The Eagles' star halfback, holder of all running records until Jimmy Brown came along, missed the game with a heel injury.

Paul Brown emerged as one of the all-time great coaches. In the next ten years, the Clevelanders were out of N.F.L. championship contention on only three occasions.

In the second game, played in Cleveland, Greasy took the Browns more seriously, held them to skimpy yardage aloft and aground, but had to settle for another loss—this time by a 13-7 margin. Incidentally, Hampton Poole, an assistant coach of the Rams, was the only expert to predict that the Browns would beat the Eagles in their first meeting. Why? Paul Brown had done a thorough scouting job, and he never left anything to chance. Besides, he also had quite a team, and the Eagles, by then, were growing old.

But, the Cleveland Browns weren't unassailable, either. They had been having everything pretty much their own way with Motley going up the middle and off-tackle on traps and draws, with Graham spearing Mac Speedie, Lavelli, and halfback-slotback Dub Jones on the sidelines, and with screen passes to Motley and to the ends as they faked staying up to block for the passer.

THE 6-1 DEFENSE. Then along came stout Steve Owen, the snuff-chewing coach of the New York Giants. It took this defensive master and pal of Greasy Neale, only a few weeks to figure out a way to stop the sideline passes and Mr. Motley. As shown in Diagram 6, Steve went into a 6-1 defense with a four-deep, man-to-man coverage.

To stop the sideline pass, coach Owen dropped Poole and Duncan, the two outside men of the six-man line, off into the flats, thereby enabling the halfbacks to play loose and cover deep. These two men rushing into the flat forced Graham to throw over them (see Diagram 7). This type of ball really hung in the air. It resulted in the Giants intercepting eight of Graham's passes in three games that year.

Another change-up employed by the Giants to keep the Browns off balance was to rush all six front men at Graham. (See Diagram 8.) This massive rush resulted in Graham being dumped on his pants for large losses on numerous occasions.   Meanwhile, Coach Brown, who was calling the plays from the sideline, had to guess when the six-man rush was coming, or when the two outside men would fall back to cover the flat area. Con­sequently, the effectiveness of the sideline pass was seriously curtailed.

Diagram 8.    The six-man rush in the 6—1 defense.

To stop Motley on his quick traps, draws, and screens, Coach Owen had his middle linebacker, Cannady, play Motley man to man all over the field. No matter what deception the Browns resorted to in order to free Motley, Cannady ignored it and kept a sharp outlook for his quarry. Owen's strategy was so effective that Cannady held Motley to a three-game total of 86 yards.

Another important factor in the Giants' success in stopping Graham, Mac Speedie, Lavelli, Jones, Motley, and company was the presence of defensive tackles Arnie Weinmeister and Al DeRogatis. Arnie and Al were very strong, agile, and fast for 250-pound men. They literally threw the Browns' offensive tackles, Groza and Rymkus, at Graham as they rushed the passer. In addition to their rush, they controlled the line of scrimmage for traps, off-tackle plays, and end runs.

The 1950 Cleveland Browns were, however, a magnificent football array. Although stymied by the Giants in the two regular season games, Cleveland finished in a tie with New York and defeated them, 8-3, in the conference playoff.

A week later the Browns beat the Rams, 30-28, in Cleveland to win the world's championship, thus concluding a salutary season in their first year of National Football League competition. Their contribution to N.F.L. offensive and defensive lore is apparent to this very day.

A NEW ZONE EMERGES

The next distinctive change in defense was the general adoption of the three-deep, 4-3 zone defense. The first time I saw it was when the Rams played the Detroit Lions in 1951, but I have heard that it was used earlier, and might even have been used against the Rams when I joined them in 1949. I was a little green at that time. Anyway, Diagram 9 shows how it shaped up.

This zone consists simply of revolving the defensive backs to the side of the flanker and the tight end. Everyone else's assignment remains the same as in the 6-1 defense except for the outside linebacker to the spread-end side. He may line up over the spread end and check him hard to the outside, or he may play half-way between the spread end and the tackle, or he may line up just outside the defensive end. The responsibilities against passes in this defense, as played by the Detroit Lions, are described in the following paragraphs.

Smith has the deep corner, Lary covers the deep middle. Christiansen goes to the corner as the flanker passes the up-man, David.   David checks the flanker to his outside, then falls back to cover the flat, his responsibility being the first swing man in that area.

Meanwhile, Flanagan, the linebacker over the tight end, checks the end to his outside and falls back into the hooking area. He plays the hook hard, looking for anyone crossing into his area.

The middle linebacker, Schmidt, has three things to key on. If the left halfback swings wide or in the flat, Schmidt falls back and covers the short middle, looking for the crossing of receivers. If the left halfback swings quick, or outside Doran, Schmidt must go to the hooking area on that side and try to knock off the left halfback before the quarterback throws the ball. If the left halfback and fullback both swing to the spread-end side, Schmidt again must fall back to the hooking area.

All three linebackers are responsible for screens and draws. The line­backers should not go to designated areas until the quarterback passes the two remaining backs, thereby eliminating the threat of the draw play.

The two defensive ends, Doran and Gandee, have multiple responsibili­ties. They must close the hole to their inside, must not allow a back to hook them in, and must rush the passer on draws and screens if they can read these maneuvers quickly enough.

The two tackles must keep the offensive guards from getting in on Schmidt. Furthermore, they must stay out of traps, rush the passer, and also help on draw plays.

The Baltimore Colts won the world championship in the years 1958 and 1959, using this same zone defense. In order to utilize this set-up to its ultimate advantage, a team must have a crushing pass rusher such as the Colts' Gino Marchetti. If a team doesn't, opponents will pick the bones clean off this type of zone defense.

Diagram 10.    The Cleveland Browns' 5-2 defense.

The Cleveland Browns are using a 5-2 defense as shown in Diagram 10. This defense is very hard to run against. Rival N.F.L. teams have tried many variations of rushing against it, but with comparatively little success.

They have, however, been able to throw fairly well against it, especially to the strong side—the side of the flanker and tight end. As you can see, Lahr and Parrish must cover man to man on these two receivers. Employing any combinations to this side, the offense has a good chance of completing a pass.

The spread end is being doubled by the two defensive halfbacks, Konz and Shofner. On other defenses, the halfbacks usually double with a line­backer. Konz cannot let the end go to his inside because of the huge area between him and Lahr for the spread end to run in. Once the end passes Konz, Shofner has to cover the end all over the field deep. Konz covers the flat area.

Michaels, the spread-side linebacker, goes to the spread-side hooking area if both backs block, if the left halfback swings wide or quick, or if both the left half and the fullback swing to the spread side.

Costello, the middle linebacker, probably has the toughest job in this defense. He lines up in a three-point stance at the outside shoulder of the offensive center to draw a block if a run shows. If no run shows, he may rush the passer or carry out the following pass-defense responsibilities. If the left halfback swings and the fullback blocks, Costello drops back and covers the short middle area. If the fullback swings to the right or strong side, Costello takes Fiss' job by going to the strong-side hooking area.

Fiss must check the end to his outside.   If both backs block, he goes to the strong-side hooking area, or helps in the flat if strategy so indicates. Fiss must cover the flat area if the fullback swings to the strong side.

The defensive ends have multiple responsibilities. Gain and Wiggins must close the hole to their inside, avoid being hooked in by the back nearest to them, must rush the passer, and help prevent draws and screens.

The defensive tackles read the guards in front of them. They should avoid being trapped. They must rush the passer and help prevent the draw play and the screen pass.

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